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The recent advancements in the wireless technology and their wide-spread 
utilization have made tremendous enhancements in productivity in the 
corporate and industrial sectors. However, these recent progresses have also 
introduced new security vulnerabilities. Since the wireless shared medium is 
completely exposed to outsiders, it is susceptible to attacks that could target 
any of the OSI layers in the network stack. For example, jamming of the 
physical layer, disruption of the medium access control (MAC) layer 
coordination packets, attacks against the routing infrastructure, targeted 
attacks on the transport protocol, or even attacks intended to disrupt specific 
applications. Unfortunately, the effects of applying the security techniques 
used in wired networks, such as access control and authentication, to 
wireless and mobile networks have been unsatisfactory due the unique 
features of such networks. As a result, achieving security goals for mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANET) has gained significant attention in recent years. 
Many critical applications of MANET, such as emergency rescue 
operations, military tactical communication, and business operations like 
mining and oil drilling platforms, require a friendly and cooperative 
environment.    
The aim of this study is to design detection mechanisms for traditional 
wormhole and Byzantine wormhole attacks by using the topological 
comparison and round trip time (RTT) measurements. The first step for 
detecting traditional wormhole attack is that an initiator of the detection 
process populates its one-hop neighbor list, and also calculates the average 
round trip time (RTTavg). Meanwhile, a list of suspected neighbors is 
generated on the basis of RTTavg and RTT.  Then, topological information is 
exchanged between the initiator and all the suspected neighbors to detect 
the presence of a wormhole link.  
In this thesis, we also focus on detecting Byzantine wormhole attack in 




hop neighbor list and calculates the average RTTavg. The initiator also 
generates a suspected list of its three hop neighbors. In the next phase, the 
initiator exchanges topological information with all the one hop neighbors 
to detect the presence of any Byzantine wormhole tunnel. One of the major 
concerns for the topological comparison based approach is to give the 
initially suspected nodes a second chance to prove their reliability by 
exchanging topological information.  
We have implemented the detection algorithms in ad hoc on demand 
distance vector (AODV) and optimized link state routing (OLSR) routing 
protocols. Then, performance evaluation of the proposed detection 
mechanisms is conducted. We also compared our proposed detection 
methods with some of the existing detection methods by simulation. The 
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In recent years, achieving security goals for mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANET) has gained significant attention due to the challenges implied by 
their unpredictable characteristics. Although military tactical 
communication was considered as the primary application of MANET, 
commercial applications of this type of networks are increasing 
significantly. Nevertheless, the commercial success of this type of network 
depends on people’s confidence in its security. Wormhole attack is one of 
the most advanced forms of security threats in MANET. In this research, 
two varieties of this type of attack (traditional and Byzantine wormhole) are 
studied. Then, their impact on the network topology is observed to design a 
topological comparison based detection scheme. The background study for 
this research project is presented in this chapter. 
1.1 Background 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of wireless devices 
which can dynamically be set up without using any pre-existing 
infrastructure or central controller. In a MANET, nodes within each other’s 
transmission range can communicate directly, whereas nodes outside each 
other’s transmission range rely on other nodes to relay messages [1]. Hence, 
a multi-hop scenario is created where every node functions as a router. The 
key features of MANETs are presented below: 
a) Autonomous terminals: In a MANET, each node is an autonomous 
terminal, which functions as both a host and router. In other words, 
besides having the basic processing abilities of a host, the nodes in a 
MANET can also perform switching functionalities as routers. So, 
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e) Bandwidth-constrained: The wireless links have significantly lower 
capacity than their hardwired counterparts. One effect of relatively 
low capacity is congestion, which is responsible for dropping the 
throughput of the network. 
f) Limited physical security: Since the wireless medium is open for all, 
mobile ad hoc networks are more vulnerable to physical security 
threats than are wired networks. The boundary that separates the 
inside network from the outside world becomes blurred [4].   
1.1.1 Applications of MANET 
The wireless communication technology has been deployed in military 
since 1970s. This allows the military to maintain an information network 
between the soldiers, vehicles, and military information headquarters [2]. In 
fact, the preliminaries of mobile ad hoc networks came from this field. 
Besides military communication, MANETs can also be deployed in 
scenarios where the pre-existing infrastructure has been damaged due to 
natural calamities (e.g., earthquake, tsunami, bushfire etc.), or human 
interventions (e.g., terror attack, theft etc.).  Another application of MANET 
would be in the mining industry, where the workers deep underneath the 
ground level would be able to communicate with the base station. In 
addition, MANETs are also suitable to be used in a university campus, 
where the participants in seminar, or students performing an experiment at 
different corners would be able to share each other’s views. In general, ad 
hoc networks can be deployed anywhere where there is little or no 
communication infrastructure or the existing infrastructure is expensive or 







1.1.2 Routing Protocols in MANET 
A sender in an ad hoc network may not always be able to pass its packets 
directly to the intended receiver. So, routing mechanisms are required 
whenever an intended receiver is outside the transmission range of the 
sender [5]. The goal of the routing protocol is to discover the latest 
topology. The routing protocols in MANET can be classified into three 
categories: 
a) Proactive routing protocols: In this family of routing protocol, all 
nodes exchange routing information periodically or whenever the 
topology changes. Since each node maintains a consistent view of 
the network, a route to the destination (if it can be reached) is always 
available. Examples of proactive routing protocols include: 
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) [6] or Optimized 
Lint State Routing (OLSR) [7]. 
b) Reactive routing protocols: In reactive routing, the route discovery 
process is initiated by a sender whenever it wants to send packets to 
a destination. The route is maintained until the destination becomes 
unreachable or is not needed anymore. Examples are: Ad hoc on-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) [8], Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) [9], and Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) 
[10]. 
c) Hybrid routing protocols: The characteristics of proactive and 
reactive routing protocols are combined to avoid the shortcomings of 
the two families and to retain most of their benefits. Examples of 
hybrid routing protocols include: Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [11], 
and Wireless Adaptive Routing Protocol (WARP) [12]. 
In the following sections, we present illustration of two of the most popular 
routing protocols in ad hoc networking: ad hoc on-demand distance vector 





focus is on designing detection mechanisms for two variations of wormhole 
attacks in AODV and OLSR routing. We also present brief descriptions on 











1.1.2.1 Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
AODV [8] is a reactive routing protocol developed for MANET which uses 
traditional routing table with one entry per destination. In this routing 
protocol, routes are established dynamically at intermediate nodes. Each 
node maintains sequence numbers to determine freshness of routing 
information and avoid routing loops. Another important feature is the 
maintenance of timer-based state, which is required to decide whether a 
routing table entry is expired or not.  
The route discovery process in AODV starts with the broadcast of route 
request (RREQ) packets by a source (S), who wants to send a packet to a 
destination (D) for which it does not have any route information. A 
recipient of RREQ first checks the sender ID and broadcast ID included in 
the RREQ packet to make sure whether it has already received the same 
RREQ. If not, it stores the sender ID as a reference for reverse path, 
increments the hop count field, and rebroadcasts the RREQ in its vicinity. 
This process is continued until a route to the destination (D) is found. The 
propagation of RREQ and RREP packets in AODV routing is shown in Fig. 
1.2 and Fig. 1.3 respectively. As shown in the figures, the broadcast RREQ 
from the source (S) is received by nodes A, E and G. Upon receiving the 
first RREQ, the destination (D) replies with RREP back to the source (S). In 
the given scenario, there are three ways to reach the destination (D) from 
the source (S): S-G-F-D, S-A-B-C-D, and S-E-B-C-D. Since S-G-F-D is the 
shortest path (3 hops), D first receives RREQ through this path. The RREP 
packet follows the reverse path where the RREQ arrived. So, RREP from D 
will reach node S through the path D-F-G-A, which is also selected as the 






1.1.2.2 Optimized Link State Routing 
OLSR [7] is a proactive routing protocol based on the traditional link-state 
algorithm where each node maintains the topology information about the 
network. In OLSR routing, each node periodically exchanges link-state 
messages, such as HELLO and Topology Control (TC). Moreover, a 
multipoint relaying (MPR) strategy is used to minimize the size of the 
control messages and the number of rebroadcasting nodes. Each node in the 
network selects a set of nodes, which is known as multipoint relays, to 
retransmit its packets. Any node exclusive of the MPR set can read the 




















Each node periodically broadcasts HELLO messages to find its one hop 
neighbors and two hop neighbors. Consequently, the sender selects a subset 
of one hop neighbors, known as MPR nodes, which covers all of its two hop 
neighbors. On the other hand, each node maintains another set of nodes, 
known as MPR selector, which includes the nodes that have selected it as an 
MPR node. For example, in Fig. 1.4, node S broadcasts HELLO messages 
and then selects nodes A, B, C and D to be its MPR nodes. This is because 





from the source node S. In OLSR routing protocol, TC messages through 
the MPR nodes are used to disseminate the topological information 
throughout the network. Hence, each can determine an optimum route to 
every destination by using topological information and the route to an 
intended destination is known when the data is transferred. 
1.1.2.3 Other Routing Protocols 
In this research project, our focus is on AODV and OLSR for the evaluation 
of our proposed detection methods.  However, there are some other routing 
protocols (reactive/proactive/hybrid) also used in ad hoc networking. In this 
section short description of DSDV, DSR and ZRP is provided.  
Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) 
The DSDV [6] routing protocol is based on the Bellman-Ford [14] routing 
algorithm and it guarantees loop free routes. In this routing protocol, a table 
of all available destinations is maintained by each node. The number of 
hops to reach a destination and the sequence number for a destination are 
also included in the routing table. In order to reduce the overhead 
transmitted through the network, two packet types, “full dump”, and 
“incremental” are used in DSDV. The full dump packet carries all the 
available routing information and the incremental packet carries only the 
information changed since the last full dump [13].     
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
In DSR [9], the source knows the complete hop-by-hop route to the 
destination and the route is stored in a route cache. When a node wants to 
send packets to another node for which it does not have the routing 
information, it starts a route discovery process by broadcasting route 
requests (RREQ) to its neighbors. Each node receiving an RREQ appends 
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An example of ZRP is shown in Fig. 1.5, where a source (s) wants to send 
data to a destination (d). In ZRP, a concept called broadercasting is used 
instead of broadcasting. According to broadercasting mechanism, node s 
verifies that d is not within its routing zone and, therefore, sends a query to 
the border of its own routing zone. As in Fig. 1.5 ρ = 1, nodes a, b and c 
receive query from node s broadercast the query. This process is repeated 
until the destination d is reached. 
1.1.3 Security Attacks in MANET 
Mobile ad hoc networks are vulnerable to a number security attacks due to 
their characteristics and nature. But the mobile devices participating in a 
MANET have limited resources and physical protection. Therefore, the use 
of strong cryptographic tools, tokens and smart cards pose huge challenge to 
the limited physical resources of the participating devices. The security 
threats on MANET can be classified by two criteria: mode of attack (active 
or passive) and origin of attack (internal or external). A classification of the 








1.1.3.1 Classification Based on the Mode of Attack 
Passive Attack 
The attackers in a passive attack can obtain the data exchanged in the 
network without disrupting any network operations. They can also launch 
an active attack by using the previously obtained information [15]. Due to 
the nature of the shared wireless communication medium, it is easier for an 
attacker to launch passive attacks in MANET than in wired networks. 
Examples of passive attacks include: eavesdropping which involves 
intercepting and reading messages by unintended receivers [16], and traffic 
analysis where the attackers analyze the data on who is communicating with 
whom, how often, how much and when [17]. 
Active Attack 
In an active attack, the attackers disrupt the normal functionality of the 
network, which includes activities such as information interruption, 
modification, or fabrication. Examples of active attacks are: sleep 
deprivation torture, which targets the batteries; jamming, which results in 
channel unavailability by overusing it; hijacking, in which the attacker takes 
control of a communication between two entities and masquerades as one of 
them and attacks against routing protocols. Most of these attacks cause 
denial of service (DoS), which is degradation or complete halt in 
communication between nodes. 
1.1.3.2 Classification Based on the Origin of Attack 
External Attack  
External attacks are launched by a node or a group of nodes that does not 
belong to the logical network. Therefore, the attackers are not capable of 





services. Nevertheless, the attackers can attempt to jam the communication 
channel to interrupt the availability of the network. It is also possible that 
the attackers form a wormhole tunnel, which misguides two distant nodes in 
believing that they are direct neighbors of each other. In the extreme case, 
the attackers can eliminate a node from the network [18].      
Internal Attack  
Internal attacks are carried out by an internal compromised or malicious 
node which a part of the network domain. This is a more severe attack 
because the attacker knows secret information and possesses privileged 
access rights. So, the internal attackers have the same capabilities of outside 
attackers, plus the ability to participate in the network protocols and 
eventually deviate from the normal behavior of the protocols. Some 
possible internal attacks include route disruption attacks such as routing 
loops, black holes, grey holes, packet dropping, wormhole with selective 
forwarding, rushing attack, and Byzantine attacks (e.g. Byzantine wormhole 
attack) [18]. 
1.1.3.3 Attacks against the Routing Protocols 
 Network layer protocols extend the connectivity from neighboring one-hop 
nodes to all other nodes in MANET. So, the main network layer operations 
in MANETs are ad hoc routing and data packet forwarding. In other words, 
MANET routing protocols exchange routing messages between nodes and 
maintain routing states at each node. The data packets are forwarded by 
intermediate nodes along an established route to the destination. The family 
of routing attacks refers to any action of advertising routing updates that 
does not follow the specifications of the routing protocol [4]. By attacking 
the routing protocol, the attackers can inject themselves into the path 
between the source and destination. A variety of attacks that target the 





Flooding Attack  
Ad hoc flooding attack acts as a denial of service (DoS) against all on-
demand ad hoc routing protocols [19]. In particular, existing on-demand 
routing protocols, such as AODV [7], DSR [11], and some secure routing 
protocols, such as SAODV [20] [21], Ariadne [22], ARAN [23], cannot be 
immune from flooding attack.  The aim of this type of attack is to exhaust 
the network resources, such as bandwidth and to consume a node’s 
resources, such as computational and battery power or to disrupt the routing 
operation to cause severe degradation of the performance of the network 
[24]. For instance, in AODV protocol, a malicious node can send a large 
number of RREQs within a short period of time to a destination, which is 
not in the network domain. As a result, the RREQs will flood the whole 
network but no reply (RREP) will be generated, because the destination 
node does not exist.  
Blackhole Attack  
In a blackhole attack, the attacker attracts data packets and then drops them 
by distributing false routing information [25]. The attacker claims that it has 
an optimum route. As a result, other good nodes tempt to route data packets 
through the malicious node. For example, in AODV routing, the attacker 
can send to the source a fake RREP with a fabricated destination sequence 
number, which is equal to or higher than that in RREQ packets.  
In Fig. 1.7 on the following page, an example of a blackhole attack in 
AODV routing protocol is shown. The source node S broadcasts RREQ to 
its neighbors to find a path to the destination D. The attacker A sends a fake 
RREP back to the source node S, claiming that it has an optimum route to 
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In Fig. 1.8, a link spoofing attack scenario is presented where node A is the 
attacker and node c is the target. During the attack, node A declares a false 
link with node g which is one of the target’s (node c) two hop neighbors. As 
a result, node c selects node A as the next hop for communicating with node 
g. So, node A can then drop or withhold the routing traffic generated by 
node c. 
Wormhole Attack  
Wormhole attack is one of the most sophisticated forms of routing attacks in 
MANET. In this attack, an attacker records packets at one location, tunnels 
them to another location of the network, where it is retransmitted by a 
colluding attacker. The tunnel can be established by using either out-of-
band private link (e.g., a wired link, or a long-range wireless transmission), 
or logical link via packet encapsulation. As a result, the tunneled packets 
arrive either sooner or with less number of hops compared to the packets 
transmitted over multi-hop routes. Based on the tunnelling mechanism they 
use, wormholes can be classified into the following categories:  
i. Out-of-band wormhole 
ii. In-band wormhole 
Before we discuss the implications of wormholes in MANET, the major 
differences between in-band and out-of-band wormholes are listed below: 
a. In an out-of-band wormhole, the colluders create a direct link 
between the two end-points, whereas in-band wormhole does not use 
any external communication medium. 
b.  Out-of-band wormhole requires special hardware to support the 
communication between the two end-points. On the other hand, in-
band wormhole does not require any special hardware or special 
routing protocol.  
c. In out-of-band wormhole, the tunneled packets arrive faster than the 





than its counterpart. In both forms of wormhole, the colluding nodes 
create the illusion that two remote regions of a MANET are directly 
connected through nodes that appear to be neighbors. 
d. In-band wormhole attack can be launched easily by any node in the 
network to another colluder or a set of colluders which may include 
one or more relay nodes. So, in-band wormholes are more likely to 
be used in real adversaries.  
e. Out-of-band wormhole adds channel capacity to the network, 
whereas in band wormhole consumes network capacity and thereby 
causes internal service degradation [26].   
f. In both forms of wormhole attack, the attackers can tunnel packets 
which are not even addressed to them [27]. They can do so even if 
the network provides confidentiality. 
Since in-band wormhole attack is simple to be implemented, it is more 
likely to take place in real life scenarios. In this research project, our focus 
is on detecting in-band wormhole attack in MANET. So, in this dissertation, 
we use the terms “in-band wormhole attack”, “wormhole attack”, and 
“traditional wormhole attack” for the same meaning.  
Wormhole could be a useful networking service while it provides a long 
link to the link layer [28]. However, the adversaries may use the wormhole 
link for their own purposes. The existence of wormhole links can disrupt the 
routing service in a number of ways. The attackers can attract a significant 
amount of traffic from their surroundings. If the attackers keep the 
wormhole tunnel active at all times and do not drop any packets, they would 
actually perform a useful service for the network [29]. But they can be 
responsible for disrupting the data flow by selectively dropping or 
modifying packets, generating unnecessary routing activities by turning off 
the wormhole link periodically, and recording packets for later analysis. In 
Fig. 1.9 and Fig. 1.10, a two-hop wormhole attack scenario is presented, 
where W1 and W3 are the main attackers and W2 acts as a relay node. The 
attackers W1 and W3 encapsulate RREQs received from the nodes in their 





capsulate the packets received from the relay node W2, and then rebroadcast 
them in their vicinity. For example, RREQs from nodes D and L will be 
tunneled from W3 to W1 and then rebroadcasted by W1 and received by 
nodes E, C and S. These nodes will reply with RREP to acknowledge the 
RREQ. As a result a source node, for example S, will select a route to a 













The Byzantine term was introduced in [30], which addressed the problem of 
trying to reach agreement between Byzantine generals in the presence of 
traitors. In general, the term is used to denote participants whose actions 
cannot be trusted, or whose action do not conform with protocol 
specification [31]. In a MANET, the participating nodes are considered 
legitimate after a formal authentication procedure. Once authenticated, these 
nodes are given full control of the network and allowed to participate in 
network operation. This leads to the Byzantine wormhole problem when 
these authenticated nodes start misbehaving and disrupting the network 
operations [32]. The aim of the Byzantine nodes is to disrupt the 
communication of other nodes, but still participate in the routing protocol 
correctly. It is possible to deploy the following types of attacks by the 
Byzantine nodes in MANET: black hole attack, flood rushing attack, 
Byzantine wormhole attack, and Byzantine overlay network wormhole 
attack. In this research project our focus is on Byzantine wormhole attack, 
the most sophisticated form of Byzantine attacks. Before we illustrate the 
features of Byzantine wormholes, we present the major differences between 
traditional wormhole and Byzantine wormhole attack as follows: 
a) In traditional wormhole attack, the colluders can fool two honest 
nodes into believing that there exists a direct link between them. But 
in Byzantine wormhole attacks, the wormhole link exists between 
the compromised nodes and not between the honest nodes. 
b) In traditional wormhole attack, the colluders are invisible to the 
honest nodes. It is because of the fact that the colluders do not 
participate in any network operations. The nodes at the endpoints of 
the wormhole tunnel overhear the ongoing transmissions in their 
vicinity and also tunnel the routing packets originated by the nodes 
within their transmission range. In Byzantine wormhole attacks, the 





wormhole attack, the attackers are authenticated nodes having full 
access to the network resources. 
c) Traditional wormhole attacks fall in the category of external attacks 
in MANETs. This is because of the fact that the attackers can be 
external entities pursuing an attack after the network is formed. The 
attackers do not require authentication or cryptographic keys to form 
a tunnel in between two honest nodes placed in different network 
regions. On the other hand, Byzantine wormhole attackers are 
authenticated nodes, which have to be compromised to form a tunnel 
in between.  So, Byzantine wormhole attack is an internal security 
attack in MANET. 
The adversaries in a byzantine wormhole attack can create the tunnel either 
by using a private communication channel, such as a pair of radios and 
directional antennas, or by using packet encapsulation. The adversaries can 
use the low cost appearance of the wormhole links in order to increase the 
probability of being selected as part of the route, and attempt to disrupt the 
network by dropping all of the data packets. The byzantine wormhole attack 
is an extremely strong attack that can be performed even only two nodes in 
the network have been compromised. In Fig. 1.11, nodes W1 and W3 are the 
two colluders who take part in the routing process and also tunnels routing 
and data packets from their respective neighborhoods. The other attacker 
W2 is only responsible for forwarding packets to and from nodes W1 and 
W3. For example, when a source node S wants to find a route to a 
destination D, the Byzantine attacker W1 tunnels the RREQs from node S to 
the other colluder W3 and via the relay node W2. Nodes W1 and W3 will 
increment the hop count as they forward the RREQ packets. However, node 
W2 is an intermediate node in the tunnel and it will not update any 
information on the RREQ packets.  As a result, node S will select the path 
S W1  (W2)  W3  D, which is actually four hops long. As the 
intermediate node W2 will not maintain routing specifications, the 
communication path between node S and node D will appear to them as S 










































1.2 Context of Research 
This thesis investigates two of the most sophisticated malicious attacks on 
MANET: traditional and Byzantine wormhole attacks. The aim of this study 
is to design detection methods for both traditional and Byzantine wormhole 
attacks by using topological information and round trip time (RTT) 
measurements. To achieve better performance than the existing detection 
schemes, efforts are placed on taking decisions based on the outcome of 
topological comparisons, rather than only RTT.  
At the first step of traditional wormhole detection, the originator of the 
detection process creates a list of its one hop neighbors, and also calculates 
the average round trip time (RTTavg). A list of suspected neighbors is 
generated on the basis of RTTavg and RTT.  Then, topological information is 
exchanged between the initiator and all the suspected neighbors before 
declaring the presence of a wormhole link.  
In the case of detecting Byzantine wormhole attack, the originator creates 
its one-hop neighbor list and calculates the average RTTavg as in the case of 
detecting traditional wormhole attack.  Unlike the detection of traditional 
wormhole attack, the main purpose of the first step here is to calculate the 
RTTavg, which is later used as the key parameter to create suspected three 
hop neighbor list. Then, the initiator exchanges topological information 
with all its one hop neighbors to detect the presence of any Byzantine 
wormhole tunnel. 
We have also compared the performance of our schemes with some of the 
existing detection methods reported in the literature. One of the major 
advantages of the topological comparison based approach is that the nodes 
which are initially suspected get a second chance to prove their reliability 







1.3 Summary of Contributions 
To the best knowledge of the author, this thesis makes the following 
original contributions to the knowledge of the field of study. 
(a) Topological comparison based approach has been designed for 
detecting traditional Wormhole attacks. Most of the existing 
detection schemes rely on RTT measurement between two 
neighboring nodes, complex authentication schemes, or require 
special hardware/middleware, which may lead to significantly 
increased system complexity or unsatisfactory detection 
performance. In topological comparison based approach, RTT 
measurements are used to divide the neighbor list of a node into two 
segments: trusted (TRST) and suspected (SUS). Then, topological 
information is exchanged between an originator of detection process 
and all nodes in its SUS list. 
(b) A topological comparison based method for detection Byzantine 
Wormhole attacks has been formulated. After observing the 
properties of byzantine wormhole attacks, we show that two 
attacked nodes always find themselves three hops away from each 
other. Hence, tunnels are detected by combining one hop and three 
hop neighborhood information.  Most of the existing detection 
schemes for byzantine attacks considers implementing new secured 
protocols, or consider special network types, which use network 
coding or multicast routing protocols. The detection method 
presented in this thesis is versatile and also simple to implement.  
(c) A round trip time (RTT) measurement technique, at the MAC layer 
of the protocol stack, has been formulated. All outgoing 
neighborhood detection packets from an originator include the time 
of departure from its MAC layer. On the other hand, every receiver 
records the arrival time of a neighborhood detection packet at the 





propagation time. This approach eliminates the queuing delays at 
the upper layers of the protocol stack. Hence, the processing time 
gives an indication of the distance between two nodes.      
(d) In topological comparison based method, an initially suspected link 
gets the second chance to prove its credibility. It is considered that 
two legitimate nodes may suffer higher round trip time due to 
factors like congestion, attenuation and weak signal strength. 
Moreover, the wireless medium is open to both honest nodes and 
malicious nodes. So, making decisions based on round trip time 
(RTT) only may lead to unsatisfactory detection rates. The 
methods presented in this dissertation decide an attack in two 
phases. As a result, comparatively higher detection rate and 
accuracy of alarms are achieved.       
(e) A comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the topological 
comparison based method has been carried out by means of 
simulations under a variety of tunnel length scenarios. The nodes 
in the network are placed randomly and the attackers are placed by 
observing the node positions such that the tunnel attracts as many 
nodes as possible. The results provide network designers and 
operators with a better understanding of the trade-off between 
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
In Chapter 2, the literature review for the thesis is presented. Existing 
solutions to both traditional wormhole and Byzantine wormhole attacks are 
categorized which is followed by discussions of their limitations. Then, the 
objectives of this research are pointed out. 
In Chapter 3, topological comparison based detection schemes for 
traditional wormhole attack is presented for both AODV and OLSR routing 
protocols in MANET. The performance of the proposed methods is 
compared with RTT-only method and some of the existing wormhole 
detection methods.  
In Chapter 4, a topological comparison based detection scheme for 
Byzantine wormhole attack is presented.  Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by 
providing a review of the research findings, and recommending some future 
research directions. 
  




2. Current State of the Detection of 
Wormhole Attacks 
In this chapter, existing detection schemes for both traditional and 
Byzantine wormhole attacks have been studied. The limitations of the 
existing methods as well as the scopes for designing a new detection 
mechanism are also discussed. Hence, the aim of the study is to design a 
detection approach which is easy to be implemented and achieves 
satisfactory detection performance. 
2.1 Combating Traditional Wormhole Attack 
The wormhole attack is one of the most sophisticated attacks in MANET. 
As this attack can be carried out in different ways, detection of this type of 
attack is a challenging task. In recent years, different approaches for 
detecting wormhole attacks have been proposed. They can be classified into 
three categories:  
a) One hop delay based approaches.  
b) Topological analysis based approaches. 
c) Approaches relying on special hardware/middleware.  
2.1.1 One Hop Delay Based Approaches 
 In [33], a wormhole detection method based on round trip time (RTT) and 
neighbor number is presented. Their method operates in the following three 
phases: 
1. construct neighbor list. 
2. find route between source and destination. 
3. find the location of the wormhole link.  




In this approach, it is assumed that the adversaries impose the following 
impacts on MANET: 
 increase the number of neighbors of the nodes they target;  
 shortens the path between the targeted nodes;  
 increase the RTT between two successive nodes.  
When the RTT between two nodes is considerably greater, they check the 
neighbor numbers. If the number of neighbors is greater than the average 
neighbor number, there is a suspect that a wormhole link is in between. The 
average number of neighbors, d, is calculated using the following formula: 
                	 	               (2.1) 
In equation 2.1, A is the area of the region, N is the number of nodes in that 
region and r is the common transmission radius. This method assumes that 
all the nodes in the network contain the same hardware and software 
configuration. Moreover, they calculate the average neighbor number using 
a formula, which is more applicable in when the nodes in the network are 
evenly distributed. 
Nait-Abdesselam et al. [34] proposed a wormhole detection method in 
OLSR protocol which attempts to pinpoint wormhole links before applying 
the detection algorithm. In addition to OLSR’s topology control (TC) 
message, two new control packets are used: HELLOreq and HELLOrep. The 
HELLOreq message is used to request an explicit reply from the neighbor. If 
the HELLOrep from a node is not reached before a predefined timeout 
interval (Timeout), the originator of the detection process ranks that node as 
suspicious and stops communication with it until the end of wormhole 
verification process. To avoid overloading the network with too many 
HELLOrep, a receiver of HELLOreq delays the replies of multiple requests 
until it is scheduled to send its normal HELLO message, and piggybacks the 
replies to this HELLO message.The aggregation of HELLOrep is shown in 
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In [36], the authors propose a timing based countermeasure against the 
wormhole attack where a node can estimate its distance to a sender by 
multiplying Packet Travel Time (PTT) by the light speed (c). A node A 
accepts another node B as neighbor if the following condition is satisfied: 
 , 	
	 	 	 	 	 , 	 	 	 	    (2.3) 
In equation 2.3, tx is the sending time of x’s HELLO message recorded by x, 
tx,y is the receiving time of y’s HELLO message recorded by x and Tmax is 
the maximum transmission range.  So, if the propagation delay is greater 
than the maximum possible propagation delay, then wormhole attack is 
detected. Unfortunately, propagation delay is difficult to be accurately 
measured.  
In another approach presented in [37], the authors propose a method called 
Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP). It is assumed that each node remains 
in promiscuous reception mode so that it can always overhear ongoing 
transmissions. Each node also maintains a Neighbor node table that contains 
RREQ sequence number, neighbor ID, sending time and receiving time of 
the RREQ and count. This table is used to monitor the activities of the 
neighbors. A Wormhole Prevention Timer (WPT) is initiated as soon as a 
node sends a RREQ. The WPT is calculated as follows: 
	 	 	     (2.4) 
In equation 2.4, TR denoted the transmission range of a node; Vp denotes 
the propagation speed of a packet (maximum with the speed of light). In 
WAP, the time interval between when a packet is forwarded by a neighbor 
since its transmission is measured. If that delay is too long (greater than 
WPT) then wormhole attack is detected. Unfortunately, this is another delay 
only mechanism that does not consider delays incurred by congestion or 
intra nodal processing speed. 
 




2.1.2 Methods Based on Graph Analyses 
Another approach of combating wormhole attacks is to use the 
neighborhood information. Maheshwari et al. in [28] proposed a wormhole 
detection algorithm which looks for forbidden substructure in the 
connectivity graph that should not be presented in a legal connectivity 
graph. The authors considered two following communication models for 
their proposed wormhole detection method:  
 Unit disk graph (UDG) model, where each node is modeled as a 
disk of unit radius. 
 General (known or unknown) communication model.   
The key notion exploited in the UDG model is Disk packing argument – 
inside a fixed region, one cannot pack too many nodes without having edges 
in between. The forbidden substructures are actually those who violate the 
packing argument.  In Fig. 2.3, the authors prove that there can only be two 
nodes inside a lune with inter distance larger than 1. In presence of 
wormhole, tow independent nodes in one region may share more than two 
common independent nodes. This constitutes a forbidden substructure, since 
in any valid UDG embedding of the connectivity graph the existence of 
more than two independent nodes inside a lune is not possible. In this 
approach, each node searches for forbidden substructure in its k-hop 
neighborhood. The main steps followed in the wormhole detection 
algorithm are: 
 Find the forbidden parameter fk  
 Each node u determines its 2k-hop neighbor list N2k(u) 
 Node u determines the set of common k-hop neighbors with v where 
Ck(u,v)=Nk(u) ∩ Nk(v) 
 Node u determines the maximal independent set of the sub-graph on 
vertices Ck(u,v). 




 If the maximal independent set size equal or larger than fk, node u 




The algorithm remains the same for detecting wormhole attacks in general 
communication model except the determination of the forbidden parameter 
fk in the first step. This approach is very complicated and impractical when 
the communication model is not known. The performance of the detection 
method largely depends on forbidden parameter fk. In the case of unknown 
communication model, which is very much expected in wireless ad hoc 
networks, the steps followed to determine fk are not definite. Determination 
of fk is crucial because the wormhole detection rate of is inversely 
proportional to it but when it is too small we may have greater false 
positives. 
Lee et al. in [38] propose a method which checks whether a node that 
forwards a packet is a real neighborhood or not. In this approach, each node 
gathers information of its neighbors within two hops. Each newly joined 
node broadcasts an announcement which is valid until the next two hops. 
The requirement of maintaining two types of neighbors, keyed hash and 
TTL limit the applicability of this method in  a distributed system where 
exists a wide variety of participants.  




2.1.3 Special Hardware/Middleware Based Methods 
Specialized methods use a special hardware device, strict time 
synchronization or special network protocol. Packet leashes are used in [27] 
to detect and defend against wormhole attacks in MANET. In this approach, 
the maximum distance a packet can travel is restricted by means of packet 
leashes. Two types of leashes are used: temporal leash and geographical 
leash. In temporal leash, a sender includes the sending time in the packet. A 
receiver of the packet compares the sender’s time with the receiving time to 
check whether the packet has traveled too far. An authentication protocol, 
TIK, has been proposed to authenticate the nodes in the network. The 
authors also assumed that all nodes in the network have tightly 
synchronized clocks. On the other hand, in geographical leash approach, a 
sender includes its own geographical location and the sending time in the 
packet. The receiving nodes compare these values with its location 
information and receiving time. As a result, a receiver can compute an 
upper bound on the distance between the sender and itself. The temporal 
leash approach requires strict clock synchronization and the geographical 
leash approach requires special hardware for knowing geographical location 
of a node. We know that strict clock synchronization is hard to achieve in a 
dynamic environment. In addition, the accuracy of GPS devices in presence 
of physical obstacles is low. As a result, both the approaches presented in 
[22] are expensive in terms of their hardware requirements.  
In [39], the authors propose to use directional antennae to combat wormhole 
attacks. In this approach, each node maintains accurate sets of their 
neighbors. Wormhole attacks are avoided if the attacker nodes are 
recognized as false neighbors. The security relies on using directional 
antennae to obtain relative direction information and cooperation among 
nodes to verify possible neighbors. This method suffers from antenna’s 
directional errors which sometimes eliminates trustable links and thus 
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2.2 Combating Byzantine Wormhole Attack 
In Byzantine wormhole attacks, more than one compromised nodes collude 
to form a wormhole tunnel. Here, the colluders are authenticated nodes 
which also take part in general network operations. Moreover, the 
wormhole link in byzantine wormhole attacks exists between two 
compromised nodes, while in traditional wormhole two honest nodes are 
tricked to believe that there exists a direct link between them [41]. Many 
solutions proposed against traditional wormholes are ineffective in the case 
of Byzantine wormhole because of the trust of the wormhole link end 
points, which are also adversarial. Existing solutions for Byzantine 
wormhole attacks mainly focus on the networks that employ the following 
approaches: 
a) network coding (e.g., RLNC [42]) 
b) multicast routing (e.g., multicast AODV [43]) 
c) general routing (e.g., AODV, OLSR ) 
In this dissertation, we focus on Byzantine wormhole attacks in 
reactive/proactive routing protocols. So, in this section, we discuss the 
existing detection methods targeted to the general routing protocols, such as 
reactive or proactive routing. In most of the recent works, secure routing 
protocols have been proposed to defend against byzantine wormhole 
attacks. We present brief overviews of two such secured routing protocols: 
On-Demand Secure Byzantine Resilient routing (ODBSR [41]), and Secure 
Routing Against Collusion (SRAC [44]). 
  




2.2.1 On-Demand Secure Byzantine Resilient 
Routing (ODBSR) 
ODBSR protocol is an on-demand routing protocol for wireless ad hoc 
networks that detects Byzantine behavior and avoids it. The protocol is 
designed to locate a fault free path in an ad hoc network, even when a 
majority of nodes have been compromised [31]. ODBSR addresses both 
failures and attacks within a unified framework. A fault is defined as any 
disruption that results in significant loss or delay. Upon detection of the 
attack, ODBSR enters probing mode with the goal of discovering the attack 
location.  
Unlike other protocols, ODBSR does not use number of hops as path 
selection metric. In ODBSR [41], the shortest path is selected based on a 
reliability metric, which captures reliability and adversarial behavior based 
on past history. Each node in the network maintains its own list, referred to 
as weight list, and dynamically updates the list when it detects faults. These 
faulty links are avoided using a secure route discovery protocol that 
incorporates the reliability metric. The ODBSR routing protocol can be 
separated into three successive phases: 
 Route discovery in an adversarial environment 
 Byzantine fault detection 
 Link weight management 
2.2.1.1 Route Discovery 
In the route discovery phase, the ODBSR protocol follows the following 
five steps: 
1. Request Initiation: The source creates and signs a request, and then 
the source broadcasts the route request to its neighbors. The source's 
signature allows the destination and intermediate nodes to 




authenticate the request and prevents an adversary from creating a 
valid route request. 
2. Request Propagation: When receiving a request, an intermediate 
node first verifies the source signature on the request and checks its 
list of recently seen requests for a matching request. If there is no 
matching request in its list, and the source's signature is valid, it 
stores the request in its list and rebroadcasts the request. If there is 
matching request, the node does nothing. 
3. Request Receipt/Response Initiation: Upon receiving a new request 
from the source, the destination verifies the authenticity of the 
request, and creates a response. The destination then signs the 
response and broadcasts it. 
4. Response Propagation: Upon receiving a response, the node 
computes the total weight of the path by summing the weight of all 
the links. If the total weight is less than any previously forwarded 
matching response, the node verifies the signatures included in the 
packet. If the entire packet is verified, the node appends its identifier 
at the end of the packet and broadcasts the response.  
5. Response Receipt: When the source receives a response, it performs 
the same verification as the intermediate nodes as described in the 
previous step. If the path in the response is better than the best path 
received so far, the source updates the route used to send packets to 
that specific destination. 
2.2.1.2 Byzantine Fault Detection 
Once the path is established, data can flow between source and destination. 
The ODBSR protocol is based on authenticated acknowledgements of the 
data packets. If a valid acknowledgement is not received within a timeout, 
ODBSR assumes that the packet was lost. The detection mechanism is 
presented below in more detail: 




Fault Detection Mechanism: The fault detection mechanism follows the 
following steps: 
1. The destination returns an acknowledgment to the source for every 
received data packet. 
2. The source keeps track of the recent losses (acknowledgements not 
received). If the losses violate the acceptable threshold, the protocol 
registers a fault between the source and destination, and starts a 
binary search on the path to locate the faulty link. 
3. The source controls the search by specifying on data packets the list 
of intermediate nodes that must send acknowledgements in addition 
to the destination. The nodes required to send acknowledgements are 
referred to as probe nodes. An adversary is unable to drop traffic 
without dropping the list of probes and eventually being detected. 
4. The list of probes defines a set of non-overlapping intervals that 
cover the whole path, where each interval covers the sub-path 
between the two consecutive probes that form its endpoints. When a 
fault is detected on an interval, the interval is divided in two by 
inserting a new probe. This new probe is added to the list of probe 
appended to future packets. The process of subdivision continues 
until a fault is detected.  
Acknowledgement Specification: For each successfully received data 
packet, the destination generates an acknowledgement containing the 
sequence number of the data packet and an HMAC for authentication. Each 
probe appends its own HMAC over the entire acknowledgement packet 
accumulated so far, and forwards it along the reverse path towards the 
source. Finally, when a source receives the acknowledgment packet, it 
attempts to verify the accumulated HMACs starting from the end of the 
packet. The protocol registers a loss on the interval between the last valid 
HMAC and the first encountered invalid HMAC. If the source times out the 




acknowledgement, a loss is registered on the interval between the source 
and the first probe.     
Interval and Probe Management: A loss is attributed to an interval 
between two probes when the source successfully received and verified an 
acknowledgment from the closer probe, but did not from the further probe. 
When the loss rate on a n interval exceeds ρ, which is the acceptable 
threshold loss rate, the interval is divided in two.  
Shared Key Establishment: ODBSR uses extensive use of pair-wise 
symmetric keys shared between the source and each node along the path. 
The authors proposed a technique for on-demand creation of these keys 
using the assumed public key infrastructure. Digital signatures are used to 
authenticate the packets before the shared key is established. 
2.2.1.3 Link Weight management 
An important aspect of the ODBSR protocol is its ability to avoid faulty 
links in the route discovery process by using a metric called link weight, 
which captures faulty and adversarial behavior. The goal is to penalize 
faulty links and to reward good behavior. When a fault is registered on a 
link, the link’s weight is doubled. This ensures that the protocol will 
eventually avoid selecting paths containing that link during future route 
discoveries.   
In addition to the weight, a counter is associated with each identified faulty 
link. This counter represents the remaining time before the link weight will 
be reset back to its initial value. If µ is the number of packets dropped while 
identifying a faulty link and ρ is the threshold loss rate, then the link’s 
counter is increased by µ/ρ. Each nonzero counter is reduced by 1/m for 








2.2.1.4 Handling Byzantine Wormholes 
ODBSR protocol approach to mitigate Byzantine wormholes is motivated 
by the observation that the primary attack when a wormhole exists is the 
dropping of packets that attempt to travel through wormhole, rather than the 
wormhole formation. A wormhole link will appear to ODBSR as a faulty 
link existing between two nodes. Once the wormhole’s link weight has been 
increased sufficiently, ODBSR will avoid it and select the next best 
alternate path. ODBSR’s ability to mitigate the wormhole will be reduced if 
many wormhole links are present. Moreover, if a wormhole is simply 
attracting traffic while waiting for a suitable time to disrupt it, or already 
subjecting that traffic to delays or packet corruption, the wormhole will 
remain invisible to ODBSR [45]. In addition, the colluding attackers may 
create a large number of fictious links, all of which must be identified as 
bad before the ODBSR protocol succeeds [46]. 
2.2.2 Secure Routing Against Collusion 
In [44], the authors proposed an algorithm which detects Byzantine attacks 
by using both message and route redundancy during route discovery. An 
optimal routing algorithm, which uses routing metric combining both a 
node’s trustworthiness and performance, is also presented.  Both of the 
proposed algorithms can be integrated into existing routing protocols, such 
as AODV and DSR. In SRAC protocol, a node makes a routing decision 
based on its trust of its neighboring nodes and the performance provided by 
them. The secured routing protocol proposed in [44] has the following 
steps: 
1. During the route discovery process, a source sends RREQs to its 
neighbors. In RREQ packets, in addition to regular information, the 
node also attaches its security related information. The RREQ 
packets have the following format: 




, , , ,    (2.5) 
In equation 2.5, k1 is a randomly generated key which acts as shared 
secret key between the source s and one its neighbors z, Kz,pub is the 
public key of z, Ks,pri is the private key of node s, mq stands for the 
message used in RREQ, E( ) stands for encryption algorithm and h( ) 
is a keyed hash MAC algorithm. Node z replies with RREP packet 
as follows: 
, , , ,   (2.6) 
In equation 2.6, mp stands for the message used in RREP. Similarly, 
s establishes a shared key with each of its one-hop neighbors. 
Moreover, by using the double hash and signature operations, node s 
can establish shared keys between itself and its n-hop neighbors. 
2. When an intermediate node receives an RREQ, it calculates the 
Trustworthiness-QoS index (TQI) by using the following formula: 
1 ; ,  for p ε Ps→ x   (2.7) 
 In equation 2.7, Ps→ x is the set of paths that start from a source node 
s to a destination node x, 0 is a constant used to scale the value 
of the cost function D(p), ;  is the trustworthiness of the path 
assigned by node x, and  is the objective function which is the 
average number of packets in the network. Then, the intermediate 
node attaches the link trustworthiness and QoS information to the 
RREQ packet and forwards it to its next hop. This process is 
repeated until it reaches the final destination. 
3. At the destination, the node waits either for a fixed number of 
RREQs or a timeout before it makes a decision. The destination 
node unicasts RREP back to the source over the link which has the 
lowest TQI. When the source node receives the RREP, it starts data 
communication by using the route. 




4. Once the route is established, the intermediate nodes monitor the 
link status of the next hops in the active routes. Those that do not 
meet the performance and trustworthiness requirements will be 
eliminated from the route.  
5. When a link breakage in an active route is detected, a route error 
(RERR) packet is used to notify the other nodes that the loss of that 
link has occurred.  
The SRAC protocol intends to optimize a combined objective function of 
security and performance parameters. The complexity of the solution to the 
routing problem is greatly reduced compared to the existing secured routing 
protocols. However, some assumptions of this protocol may not be 
practical. According to SRAC protocol, each node is required to receive 
multiple copies of the same route discovery message before sending back an 
acknowledgment. For example, to detect the collusion of n compromised 
nodes that are consecutively located on a route, a receiver must have at least 
n+1 copies of the same message, and one of the copies is more trusted than 
the others. Moreover, the redundant use of shared keys between a source 
and each intermediate and the destination node may result in a scalability 
problem. For example, if there are n nodes along a route, then the dynamic 
key management scheme needs to create and distribute 1 /2 keys to 
the nodes on the route. Hence, it is not appropriate for the networks with a 
large number of low-resource nodes.  
  




2.3 Objectives of This Study 
It can be noted that most of the existing detection methods reported in this 
chapter rely on RTT, specialized devices or graph analysis. The RTT based 
detection methods are unreliable in most cases, because of the assumption 
that the link containing wormhole tunnel suffers significantly long delay 
compared to other real links. Link delays also may be incurred in case of 
congestion, intra nodal processing speed and queuing delay.  
Furthermore, in some studies, specialized devices, such as GPS, directional 
antennae etc., have been utilized. These studies introduced a new paradigm 
of wormhole detection by making use of external technology. However, in 
MANETs, the participants are low performance devices and they have 
energy constraints. So, utilizing such external technology may not be 
efficient in terms of cost and availability.      
In some studies, detection methods based on graph analysis is proposed. 
These approaches make use of the graphical representation of a network and 
analytically avoid wormhole tunnels. The computational complexity of 
these methods is much higher than other detection approaches. Moreover, 
graphical analysis based approaches depends on the prior knowledge of the 
communication model. Unfortunately, in a dynamic network, such as 
MANET, the system model may change without any prior notification.  
The detection mechanisms and secured routing protocols reported in the 
previous sections may be secure but not feasible or vice versa.  On the other 
hand, MANETs have some vulnerable characteristics, such as open peer-to-
peer architecture, no fixed infrastructure (e.g., router), and easily accessible 
wireless channel. As a result, there is no well defined place/infrastructure 
where a single security solution can be deployed [4]. In addition, the 
computation capabilities of mobile devices are limited. For example, PDAs 
can hardly perform computation-intensive tasks like cryptographic 
calculations. Hence, designing a security solution that achieves higher 
detection as well as desirable network performance is a challenging task. In 




this study, a topological comparison based approach to detect both 
traditional and Byzantine wormhole attacks is presented. In the topological 
comparison based approach, the topological misbehavior, such as bogus-
shortcuts among the nodes is used as a symptom of the presence of a 
wormhole tunnel. Two distant nodes find themselves as direct neighbors in 
presence of a traditional wormhole tunnel, whereas Byzantine wormhole 
tunnel makes them believe that they are constantly three-hops away from 
each other. This approach is simple as well as effective in terms of 
wormhole detection rate and wormhole detection accuracy. The details of 









3. Detection of Traditional Wormhole 
Attacks Using RTT and Topological 
Comparisons 
In presence of traditional wormhole tunnel, the RTT between two fake 
neighbors is much longer than between two true neighbors. However, 
longer RTT does not confirm the existence of a wormhole tunnel. This is 
because other than the wormhole tunnel there are factors (e.g., congestion, 
intra-nodal processing speed, geographical barrier etc.) that can also 
contribute to long RTT. In this chapter, a detection method for traditional 
wormhole attacks is presented. The proposed method detects traditional 
wormhole attack by using a topological comparison algorithm. 
3.1 Round Trip Time (RTT) Measurement 
In the field of telecommunications, Round Trip Time (RTT) is defined as 
the time interval between when a packet is sent and when the corresponding 
acknowledgement is received. One of the most common applications of 
RTT is finding the best possible route in a communication network. It can 
range from a few milliseconds (thousandths of a second) under ideal 
conditions between closely positioned nodes to several seconds under 
adverse conditions between nodes separated by a large distance. In the 
context of computer networking, RTT is also known as the ping time which 
can be determined by using the ping command. 
3.1.1 RTT Measurement in TCP 
One easy way of measuring RTT is to record the time when a packet is sent 
and calculate the elapsed time when the acknowledgement (ACK) is 





received. Unfortunately, in TCP there is no way to tell whether a received 
acknowledgement (ACK) is for an original or retransmitted packet. This is 
known as “retransmission ambiguity” problem [47]. P. Karn, one of the 
authors of [47] proposed an algorithm known as “Karn’s algorithm” which 
addresses the problem by ignoring round-trip times of retransmitted packets.  
In TCP, a sender records how long it takes for a packet to be acknowledged 
by producing a sequence of RTT samples (s1, s2, s3….). TCP 
implementations estimate the future RTT of a connection by sampling the 
behavior of the packets sent over it and averaging those samples into an 
smoothed round trip time (SRTT). The formula used in SRTT is as follows: 
∝	 1 ∝    (3.1) 
In equation 3.1, SRTTi+1 is the new calculated value, SRTTi is the current 
estimate of the round trip time, and α is a constant between 0 and 1. The 
constant α controls how rapidly the smoothed round trip time adapts to 
change.   
3.1.2 Our Proposed RTT Measurement Method 
3.1.2.1 Asynchronous Clock 
We propose to measure the round trip time (RTT) between a source and its 
n hop neighbors by broadcasting HELLO packets. The recipients of 
HELLO packet either rebroadcast it until the nth hop is reached or respond 
with a unicast HELLOrep. In HELLO packet, the hops_to_leave header is 
used to indicate the number of hops it should travel. Besides, the broadcast 
time is recorded by the sender so that RTT can be calculated when a 
HELLOrep is reached. Each node maintains an exponentially weighted 
average round trip time (RTTavg) for its n hop neighbors. The RTT and 
RTTavg are calculated using the following formulae: 
	 	 	 	 	 	    (3.2) 





    (3.3) 
∝	 1 ∝  (3.4) 
The difference between the SRTT used in TCP and the RTTavg in our 
proposed method is in the samples used in the exponentially weighted 
moving average (EWMA) formula. We use the RTTs between a sender and 
all n hop neighbors as samples. In the following figures we present a 
scenario to discuss the calculations of RTT and RTTavg for two hop 










In Fig. 3.1, the source node (S) broadcasts HELLO messages in the network 
to calculate the RTT of its two hop neighbors (hops_to_leave = 2). Since 
nodes 1, 2 and 3 are within the transmission range of node S, they receive 
the HELLO from node S. They decrement the hops_to_leave field and 
rebroadcast the HELLO. It should be noted that repetitive HELLOs from 
the same source are dropped. Finally, the HELLO from node S reaches 
nodes 4, 5 and 6, which are two hops away. They send HELLOrep back to 
the source (S). The successive values RTTavg are calculated upon each 
reception of HELLOrep at node S. For example, the HELLOrep from node 4, 
represented by	 , reaches the source (S) before   
and	 . Hence, the calculations at node S are as follows: 
	 	 	 	 	 	    (3.5) 
    (3.6) 
When node S receives  it calculates the RTT and updates the 
value of RTTavg as follows: 
	 	 	 	 	 	    (3.7) 
∝	 1 ∝    (3.8) 
Similarly, node S receives  it calculates the RTT and updates the 
value of RTTavg:  
	 	 	 	 	 	    (3.9) 
∝	 1 ∝   (3.10) 
In this particular case, the samples used for the exponentially weighted 
moving RTTavg are R0, R1 and R2 which are the RTTs between node S and 
nodes 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Hence, rather than calculating a SRTT for 
each individual neighbor, our method maintains a distributed RTTavg taking 
individual RTTs as sample. 





In a dynamic network like MANET, where nodes can join/leave the 
network without any prior notification or a node may be closed down due to 
energy constraints, a node can’t be certain about the number of its n hop 
neighbors. So, it is desirable to have a predefined timeout interval, for 
example timeoutrtt, after which a node will discard any HELLOrep from its 
neighbors. We can correlate this timeoutrtt with the retransmission time-out 
(RTO) of TCP which represents the amount of time the sender will wait for 
a given packet to be acknowledged. In TCP, the RTO is calculated from the 
smoothed round trip time (SRTT) and the deviation of round trip time 
( ), using the following formula: 
	4 ∗      (3.11) 
Since our goal is to create n hop neighbor list and divide it into two 
segments (Trusted and Suspected, which are introduced in later sections) so 
that we can apply our topological comparison scheme on the Suspected 
neighbors only, we set the timoutrtt interval in relation to n as follows: 
, 	    (3.12) 
In equation 3.12, k is the delay factor, chosen such that there is a little 
chance that the HELLOrep from a real n hop neighbor will reach the sender 
after timeoutrtt. But there are some scenarios such as a wormhole attack, 
congested link, intra nodal processing speed, for which HELLOrep from a 
neighbors may reach the source after the timeoutrtt. If  is reached 
the sender beyond timeoutrtt then RTTx is not used as a sample.  
  





3.1.2.2 Synchronous Clock 
If the clocks are synchronized, RTT can be measured at the MAC layer of 
the protocol stack. Two additional fields, propt and time, are used in the 
HELLO packet. The value of propt and time denotes the actual propagation 
delay and local clock respectively. In this approach, propt and time are 
updated when a HELLO packet is reached the MAC layer. This approach 
produces better timing analysis because upper layer delays (specially the 
delay associated with routing in the network layer) are avoided. In Fig. 3.3, 
the RTT measurement in a synchronous network is shown. 
 
Figure	3.3	Measuring	RTT	at	the	MAC	layer	
In the figure, four major steps of calculating RTT is shown. In step 1, when 
the HELLO packet reaches the sender’s MAC layer, propt is set to 0, time is 
set to current clock, and then the HELLO packet is broadcasted in the 
network. In the 2nd step, when the HELLO packet reaches the MAC layer of 
the receiver, the one way propagation delay from the source to the receiver 
is calculated and saved in propt, before the HELLO packet is pushed up to 
the upper layers. Upon receiving a HELLO packet at the application layer, 
HELLOrep packets are generated. Unlike the HELLO sender, the sender of 
the HELLOrep attaches the propagation delay calculated in step 2 in propt 
and then unicasts the HELLOrep back to the source. In this way, upper layer 
delays can be avoided. Eventually, when the HELLOrep reaches the MAC 
layer of the initiator, the round trip time is calculated using the same 
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under normal circumstances, with 250m transmission radius, an n hop 
neighbor must be within n × 250m away from the source. However, one of 
the devastating scenarios where violation of this nature of n hop neighbors 
occurs is in the presence of a wormhole tunnel. Although there are some 
other factors such as congestion, queuing delay, or intra nodal processing 
speed which can also increase the RTT between two nodes but the distortion 
of topology only occurs in presence of a wormhole tunnel (traditional or 
Byzantine). In the following section the effect of wormhole tunnel on the 
topological view is presented. 
3.2.2 Effects of Wormhole on Topology 
The attackers create the wormhole illusion by tunneling HELLO packets 
between two remote nodes. As a result, two remote nodes consider 
themselves as direct neighbors. This false link information is propagated to 
other nodes across the network via TC messages (in OLSR) or RREP (in 
AODV). The result is the creation of two routing “black holes”, one at each 
endpoint of the tunnel [48]. The term “black hole” is defined in [48] as the 
ability of the tunnel endpoints to attract traffic.  
For the success of the wormhole tunnel, the attackers make sure that the 
tunnel does not collapse. A wormhole tunnel collapses when its tunnel 
endpoints fail to forward packets between remote network regions. A 
solution to the wormhole collapse problem is using intermediate colluders 
to relay packets between the tunnel endpoints. In presence of intermediate 
relay nodes, the tunnel endpoints are able to communicate persistently 
during the attack. Using multiple intermediate colluders may provide 
additional resilience to topology changes and a potentially stealthier 
wormhole attack [48]. In this study, it is assumed that there is at least one 









































In Fig. 3.5, a two hop wormhole attack scenario is presented. Initially, node 
s does not have any known route to d and therefore, it starts a route 
discovery process looking to find a path to d. The RREQs generated from 
node s is tunneled by the attacker nodes 1, 2 and 3, and then rebroadcasted 
in the region where d is placed. Node d sends back RREP to node s when it 
receives the RREQ. Since the attackers do not disclose their identities, both 
s and d finds themselves as direct neighbors. Consequently, they start 
sending data packets which travel through the wormhole tunnel.  
Furthermore, when node s broadcasts HELLO packets to find its one hop 
neighbors, nodes d, f and g also receive that because of the tunneling of the 
wormhole attackers. Hence, nods s creates its one hop neighbor list which 
includes a, b, c, e, d, f and g. Similarly, node d enlists the nodes s, b and e in 
its one hop neighbor list. As shown in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7, it is clear that in 
the presence of wormhole tunnel, the topological view of the network is 
distorted.   
3.3 Detection of Traditional Wormhole Attacks 
in MANET 
In this section, a detection method is presented which uses round trip time 
(RTT) measurement and topological comparison for detecting traditional 
wormhole attacks in MANET. The proposed scheme is based on the 
following observations on wormhole attack: 
 Two fake neighbors (e.g., s and d as in Fig. 3.5), with a 
wormhole tunnel in between, usually experience longer RTT 
compared to the RTT between two real neighbors (e.g., s and b as 
in Fig. 3.5). Two nodes suspect each other to be fake neighbor 
when the following inequality holds: 
    (3.13) 





In equation 3.13, k is the delay factor which depends on the 
length of the tunnel, and RTTavg is the average RTT between a 
node and all its real neighbors. In this wormhole detection 
method the value of k is considered to be 3, because it is assumed 
that two fake neighbors are at least 3 hops away from each other. 
Equation 3.12 and equation 3.13 are similar, but they have 
different applications. The earlier is used for calculating the 
maximum time a node should wait for receiving HELLOreps from 
its neighbors; however, the latter is used for calculating round trip 
time between a source and its k hop neighbours.     
 In most cases, two real neighbors have at least one common real 
neighbor between them, but usually it is not true for two fake 
neighbors. The probability of not having a common neighbor is 
shown in Appendix 2.  In Fig. 3.5, nodes s and d are deceived by 
the wormhole attackers. So, they believe each other as direct 
neighbors even though they don’t have any common real 
neighbors. 
3.3.1 Neighbor List 
Each node in the network maintains a Neighbor List and an associated 
RTTavg of one hop neighbors. The Neighbor List population process is 
initiated by broadcasting HELLO packet in the network. Two nodes are 
considered as neighbors when they exchange HELLO and HELLOrep 
between them. Since wormhole tunnel induces packet latency, the 
HELLOrep from a fake neighbor reaches the source much later than that 
from a real neighbor. This packet latency is used as a metric to separate the 
Neighbor List into two segments: Trusted (TRST) and Suspected (SUS). If 
the RTT between the source and a neighbor is more than k times the current 
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However, when they compare the TRST part of their respective Neighbor 
Lists, they find nothing in common. So, topological comparison gives those 
real neighbors, which are included in the SUS part of a Neighbor List, a 
second chance to prove their reliability. The wormhole detection method 
presented here is triggered when a source finds non empty SUS part in the 
Neighbor List. Two more packet types are used for doing the topological 
comparison: ENQ and ENQrep. The steps of the topological comparison 
phase are presented below: 
 After the neighbor discovery is done a node sends ENQ packets 
to the suspected neighbors (Suspected part of the Neighbor List).  
 In response to ENQ packet, a node sends back ENQrep, which 
includes its own TRST list.   
 The source node compares the received TRST list with its own 
TRST list. If a node is found to be attacked by a wormhole, its ID 
is saved in another list DET. Otherwise, the node is deleted from 
SUS list and included in the TRST list of the source. 
The outcome of the wormhole detection method depends on the values of 
me, suspect and trust. There are four decisive states of the detection 
algorithm: 
1) , : When s is not included in 
TRSTr, and the number of elements in   ∩	  is at least 
equal to the number of elements in ∩	 . As a result, 
node s decides that the link sr is attacked by wormhole and r is 
inserted in the DETs. 
2) , : When s is not included in 
TRSTr, and the number of elements in ∩	  is more than 
the number of elements in ∩	 . As a result, node s 
decides that the link sr is safe and r is deleted from the SUSs and 
inserted in to TRSTr. 
3)  , 	&	 0 : When ∈  and 
∩	  can be empty but ∩	  must be empty. 





As a result, node s decides that the link sr is safe and r is deleted 
from the SUSs and inserted in to TRSTr. 
4) , 	&	 0 : When ∈  and 
∩	  is empty and ∩	  is non empty. As a 
result, node s decides that the link sr is attacked by wormhole and 
r is inserted into DET. 
3.3.3 System Reactions When a Wormhole Attack is 
Detected 
The originator of the detection process reacts to minimize the damage by 
halting any communication with a wormhole attacked node. For instance, if 
the link sr is attacked by wormhole, the originator (s) stops sending 
packets to node r. Node s can also inform its trusted one hop neighbors 
about node r being attacked, so that, they can also react by halting any 
communication with r.     
3.3.4 Security of the Detection Method 
The topological comparison based detection method can itself be vulnerable 
to modification attacks. For example, the wormhole attackers (tunnel 
endpoints) can send TRST and SUS lists of their own. In other words, they 
can alter a TRUST or SUS list propagating through the tunnel. So, it is 
important that the contents of unicast packets like ENQ and ENQrep are 
protected. Unfortunately, designing authentication and cryptographic 
schemes is outside the scope of this study. So, we propose to use the 
security measures presented by Y. Hu et al. in [27] to further improve the 
security of the network.  
 
  





3.4 Performance Evaluation Using ns-2 
Simulator 
3.4.1 Network Simulator (ns-2) 
Network Simulator (also popularly called ns-2) is a "discrete event" 
simulator and is heavily used in ad hoc networking research. It provides 
necessary support for simulating wired and wireless networks. The ns-2 
simulator is coded in two languages: C++ and OTcl. Simulation objects are 
mirrored in both realms—that means that if one defines a node and some 
variables associated with a node, the node variables are accessible from 
code in either language. The intent of this design is to put computationally 
intensive code in a compiled language (C++), where it can execute fast, 
while allowing the user to configure the simulator in a more user-friendly 
scripting language-- in this case, OTcl, or object-oriented Tcl.  
3.4.2 Generating Topologies in ns-2  
Network scenarios have been generated using Tcl scripts. To evaluate the 
performance of the wormhole detection method, topologies are generated 
dynamically using random number generator to place nodes within an area 
ranging from 800m × 800m to 1400m × 1400m. A minimum distance 
(ranging from 90m to 200m) is maintained between each node in the 
network. The wormhole attackers are also placed randomly in between two 
randomly selected (target) nodes in different network segments.  The 
distance between each wormhole attacker is varied on the basis of network 
area and number of nodes. Another exciting feature of randomly generated 
scenarios is that the topology changes for every simulation run. Hence, the 
performance evaluation of the wormhole detection method presented in this 
study is reliable.  





3.4.3 Simulating Traditional Wormhole Attack 
In the traditional wormhole attack, two colluding nodes tunnel packets from 
their vicinity and attract as many nodes as possible. In between the 
colluders there are relay nodes placed to increase the length of the tunnel. 
The relay nodes are responsible for forwarding packets through the tunnel. 
It should be noted that both the attackers and the relay nodes remain silent 
to other participating nodes. This means that they neither participate in any 
network operations, such as routing, nor respond to neighbor discovery or 
topological comparison packets. They hide their identities by encapsulating 
the targeted packets.   
Two new application layer agents have been designed in ns-2 to simulate 
the wormhole attack. Their functionalities are described below: 
 myAgent: This agent is used to allocate HELLO, HELLOrep, ENQ 
and ENQrep packets. Moreover, the topological comparison between 
a source node and a suspected neighbor is also conducted by this 
agent. It is attached to every honest node as well as the attackers 
(excluding the relay attackers). This agent also stores the outcome of 
the wormhole detection method as a list (DET) of neighbors which 
are attacked by a wormhole.    
 Tunnel: The Tunnel agent is attached to only the wormhole 
attackers which are responsible for tunneling packets from one 
location to the other. So, both myAgent and Tunnel agents are 
attached to the two endpoints of the wormhole tunnel. This agent is 
responsible for encapsulating the targeted packets to another packet 
type (TUNNEL), which is only transmitted through the tunnel. 
When an encapsulated packet reaches an endpoint, the TUNNEL 
type packet is de-capsulated to obtain the original packet.    
  





3.4.4 Performance Metrics 
The performance of the wormhole detection method presented in this 
chapter is measured in regards to the following two metrics: 
 Detection rate: The term “Detection rate” takes into account the 
number of nodes that are possibly attacked by a wormhole and how 
many of them are successfully detected. The following formula is 
used to determine the detection rate: 
	 	 	 . 	 	 	
	 . 	 	
 (3.14) 
 Accuracy of alarms: The accuracy of alarm represents the 
efficiency of the wormhole detection method when it detects 
possible attacks by using topological comparison. It takes into 
account the number of links declared as attacked by a wormhole and 
how many of them are actually affected. The following formula is 
used to determine the accuracy of alarm:    









3.5 Wormhole Detection in AODV Routing 
Protocol 
In AODV routing, the wormhole attackers tunnel the RREQs from one part 
of the network to another part. For example, in Fig. 3.5, the RREQ from 
node s is recorded by the attacker node 1 and then tunneled to the other 
attacker node 3, which rebroadcasts the same RREQ to its vicinity. As a 
result the route s123d is selected as the path for communication 
between s and d. The wormhole detection method presented in the previous 
section works in AODV routing as follows: 
 When a source s wants to send data packets to a destination d but 
does not have a route to d, node s broadcasts RREQ in the network. 
The broadcast time is recorded as Trreq.  
 Each node calculates a response timeout suggesting a time interval 
before which the RREP from a one hop neighbor should reach. The 
response timeout is calculated using the following formula: 
	 	 	4 ∆   (3.16) 
In equation 3.16, R is the transmission radius (usually 250m) of a 
node, C is the speed of light (the maximum speed a packet can 
travel) and ∆ is the time spent in the protocol layers. Usually, ∆ 
represents the time taken by a packet to travel from the application 
layer to the physical layer and vice versa.    
 When an RREP  for a destination d is received at node s, it 
calculates the RREP response time as follows: 
	 	    (3.17) 
 If the RREP suggests that the intended destination is one hop away 
and the response time is less than the response timeout, node s starts 
sending data packets to node d. If the response time is greater than 





the response timeout, node s triggers the wormhole detection 
method. 
 At this stage, the source node s compares its own one hop neighbor 
list with the one hop neighbor list of node d.  
In this section the performance of the wormhole detection method is 
evaluated with AODV routing protocol. The implementation of the 
detection has been presented in section 3.4.  In addition, the performance 
the method presented in this thesis is compared with the method proposed 
by Z. Tun et al. [33], T. V. Phuong et al. [35] and the RTT-only phase (not 
executing the topological comparison phase) of the proposed detection 
method. The results show that both high detection rate and accuracy of 
alarms can be achieved with topological comparison based approach. This 
is because the suspected nodes get a second chance to justify their 































Fig. 3.10 shows the detection rate versus tunnel length for different network 
sizes ranging from 10 nodes to 30 nodes. It can be seen that the detection 
rate of the topological comparison based wormhole detection approach 
shows an increasing trend as the length of the wormhole tunnel is increased. 
This is because that with longer tunnel length the probability of the actually 
attacked neighbors being included in the Suspected part of the source’s 
Neighbor List is almost certain due to the long RTT between them. In 
addition, with larger network sizes more genuine neighbors are likely to be 
removed from the Suspected list and thus increases the detection rate. The 
detection rate curves are almost identical for larger network sizes because 
the rate of change in network size is much higher than the rate of change in 





































In Fig. 3.11, the accuracy of alarm chart is shown as a function of the 
tunnel length. It can be seen that for longer tunnel length, higher accuracy 
can be achieved. It is because that, with longer tunnel length, the RTT 
between a pair of fake neighbors is longer and thus less genuine neighbors 
to be included in a Suspected list. However, we can see a little dip in the 
accuracy of alarm when the tunnel length is 4-5 and rise again. This may be 
due to simulation randomness. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
topological comparison, we compare our scheme with RTT-only (i.e., not 
executing neighbor list comparison). Fig. 3.11 also shows the accuracy of 
alarms of RTT-only versus tunnel length for different network sizes. It can 
be seen that our scheme achieves much higher accuracy of alarms as the 
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Figure 3.12 shows a performance comparison between the topological 
comparison based approach and the RTT based methods presented by Z. 
Tun et al. in [33] and T. V. Phuong et al. in [35].  The topological 
comparison based approach performs much better when the tunnel length is 
smaller (e.g., less than 5 hops). As the authors in [33] considers the long 
RTT between two fake neighbors and the number of neighbors, for smaller 
tunnels it becomes difficult for this approach to identify the real neighbors 
from a list of suspected neighbors. However, for larger tunnel lengths their 
detection rate is identical because the possibility of real neighbors to be 
included in the Suspected list is small. On the other hand, the authors in 
[35] detects wormhole attacks based on the transmission time between 
every two successive nodes along the established path. So, when the tunnel 
length is small, the transmission time between legitimate nodes and the 
wormhole attackers are almost identical which makes the detection difficult.     
3.6 Wormhole Detection in OLSR Routing 
Protocol 
In OLSR routing, each node periodically exchanges link-state messages, 
such as HELLO and Topology Control (TC). It also uses a multipoint 
relaying (MPR) strategy, which minimizes the size of the control messages 
and the number of rebroadcasting nodes. In wormhole attack scenario, an 
attacker encapsulates the HELLO messages from its vicinity and tunnels 
them to another attacker. The colluding attacker de-capsulate the tunneled 
message and then rebroadcast the same HELLO message to its vicinity. For 
example, in Fig. 3.5, the HELLO messages from nodes s, b and e are 
tunneled by the wormhole attacker node 1 to the colluder node 3 via the 
relay node 2. Eventually, nodes d, f and g receive the same HELLO 
messages. As a result, nodes s, b or e will choose d, f or g as MPR and vice 
versa. This leads to exchange of some Topology Control (TC) packets 
through the wormhole tunnel (1-2-3). Since only the MPR nodes are 
responsible for forwarding TC packets, selecting MPRs that possess flawed 





network topology may lead to routing disruption and ultimately result in 
performance degradation of the network as a hole.  
The interval between two successive HELLO messages is predefined.  We 
propose that after n number of HELLO transmissions, a node sends 
HELLOdet which represents the HELLO for one hop neighbor discovery 
phase of the wormhole detection method. The subsequent phases of the 
wormhole detection process are as mentioned in section 3.3. The number n 
depends on the desired security level. The performance evaluation of the 
topological comparison based wormhole detection method is presented in 
Fig. 3.13 and Fig. 3.14. In Fig. 3.13, the topological based approach is 
compared with the method proposed by the authors in [34]. The graph 
shows that the detection rate for the topological comparison based method 
is significantly higher than the other method. In addition, higher accuracy of 
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3.7 Message Overhead and Detection Time 
The topological comparison based method gives the initially suspected 
nodes a second a chance to verify the reliability. However, this approach 
introduces some message overhead to the system. In the wormhole 
detection method proposed in this thesis, we use HELLO, HELLOrep, ENQ, 
ENQrep messages. Since our proposed wormhole detection method achieves 
very high detection rate and thus ensures security to the system, the 
associated message overhead can be tolarated.   
We have also studied the detection time for the topological comparison 
based detection method. We have assumed that a suspected node knows the 
one hop neighborhood information and responds immediately after reciving 
ENQ message. Therefore, the delay components considered are: 
 The time elapsed between when the originator broadcasts HELLO to 


























15 Nodes (Nait-Abdesselam et al.)
30 Nodes (Nait-Abdesselam et al.)





  The time elapsed between when the originator sends ENQ message 
and the time and when it receives corresponding ENQrep; 
 The running time of the topological comparison algorithm. 
In Fig 3.15, the detction time for different tunnel lengths is shown. Since the 
HELLO, HELLOrep,ENQ and ENQrep messages travel through the tunnel, 




































In this chapter, the topological comparison based approach of detecting 
traditional wormhole attack has been presented. The performance 
evaluation is done in AODV and OLSR routing protocol. Extensive 
computer simulations using the network simulator (ns-2) tool have been 
carried out to simulate different network scenarios, involving different 
tunnel lengths and network sizes. Comparison with some of the existing 
detection methods and with the RTT-only phase of the proposed method has 
been presented in terms of detection rate and accuracy of alarm. It is found 
that the topological comparison based approach achieves higher detection 
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In Fig. 4.1, a two hop Byzantine wormhole attack scenario is presented, 
where node x, y and z are authenticated nodes that collude to perform the 
attack. Node y is responsible for forwarding encapsulated packets between 
the colluders. So, node y can be defined as a relay node. Unlike traditional 
wormhole attack, the attackers respond to neighbor discovery packets 
(HELLO). If a HELLO for one hop neighbor discovery (hops_to_leave = 1) 
is received by an attacker, it replies with HELLOrep back to the source. 
Otherwise, if the HELLO is for n hop neighbors discovery (hops_to_leave 
= n), it decrements the hops_to_leave field, encapsulates the HELLO 
packet, and tunnels it towards the other colluder. However, the relay node 
does not decrement the hops_to_leave to ensure that the tunnel can attract 
traffic towards it by offering better path in terms of hop count.   
For example, according to Fig. 4.1, the source (s) may choose to send the 
data packets to d the path sx(y)zd. Although there are four hops 
(physical topology) between them, both node s and d believe that they are 
three hops (logical topology) away. Figure 4.2 shows the one hop topology 
of node s. It can be seen that the target node s includes an attacker (x) in its 
one hop topology. The three hop topology of node s is shown in Fig. 4.3. 
The nodes that are shaded gray, in Fig. 4.3, are suspected to be attacked by 
wormhole. In Fig. 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, the three hop physical topologies of 
node a, b, c and x are shown respectively. It should be noted that a, b, c and 
x are the one hop neighbors of node s.  
So, the targets (placed at different network regions) of a Byzantine 
wormhole tunnel find themselves three hops away from each other. In 
addition, a target’s suspected three hop neighbors are also suspected by its 
one hop neighbors. These effects of Byzantine wormhole tunnel are 
considered for designing a topological comparison based detection method.   
 





4.2 Detection of Byzantine Wormhole Attacks in 
MANET 
In this section, a Byzantine wormhole detection method is presented. The 
proposed detection method makes use of both one hop and three hop 
topologies. It is based on the following observations/assumptions:  
 Two nodes, targeted by Byzantine wormhole attackers, find 
themselves three hops away from each other, regardless of the 
tunnel length. This is because of the assumption that the 
intermediate relay nodes do not change the hop count.   
 A link containing Byzantine wormhole tunnel offers shorter paths in 
terms of hop count so that a lot of traffic can be attracted.   
 The RTT between two fake three hop neighbors is greater than k 
times the RTTavg for one hop neighbors. However, some real three 
hop neighbors may be suspected because of some common delay 
factors (e.g., congestion, queuing delay etc.) as stated earlier in 
Chapter 3. 
 A node can discover its n hop neighborhood information by 
broadcasting HELLO packet with the hops_to_leave field set to n.  
A recipient of HELLO either replies with HELLOrep in case 
hops_to_leave equals 1, or rebroadcast the same HELLO after 
decrementing hops_to_leave. 
 A three hop neighbor list has two parts: Trusted_three_hop and 
Suspected_three_hop. Unlike the traditional wormhole detection, a 
one hop neighbor list does not have trusted or suspected segment. 
This is because, Byzantine wormhole attacks are detected by 
comparing three hop topology (not one hop topology) of a source 
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4.2.3 Topological Comparison Algorithm 
In Byzantine wormhole detection method, topological comparison is done 
between an originator and its one hop neighbors. The topological 
comparison algorithm is executed when the originator finds it has a non 
empty Suspected_three_hop list. The steps of the topological comparison 
algorithm are presented below: 
 After the neighbor discovery phase, the originator sends ENQ 
packets to its one hop neighbors. This probes the one hop neighbors 
to send back their complete three hop neighbor lists. 
 A recipient of ENQ packet replies with ENQrep by attaching its 
complete three hop neighbor list ( _ _  
and	 _ _ ).  
 Upon receiving an ENQrep packet, the originator compares its own 
suspected three hop neighbor list ( _ _  with 
the trusted three hop neighbor lists ( _ _  of the 
one hop neighbors.  
 The originator also maintains a list of attacked nodes in DET.  A 
node (x) is declared as attacked by Byzantine wormhole and 
therefore its ID is inserted into DET if the following conditions are 
true for node x: 
o Node x is included in the suspected three hop neighbor list of 
the originator.  
o Node x is not considered as a trusted three hop neighbor by 
any of node s’s one hop neighbor. 
 Due to a large RTTavg of the one hop neighbors, the originator may 
initially trust a fake three hop neighbor (x). To avoid such cases the 
originator compares its own trusted three hop neighbor list 
( _ _ ) with the suspected three hop neighbor list 
( _ _ ) of its one hop neighbor. A node (x) is 
eliminated from the originator’s trusted three hop neighbor list and 





therefore declared as attacked by Byzantine wormhole tunnel if the 
following conditions are satisfied for node x: 
o Node x is included in the trusted three hop neighbor list of 
the originator.  
o Node x is considered as a suspected three hop neighbor by at 
least two one hop neighbors of the originator. 
//send ENQ packets to each one hop neighbor 





  and 	 _ _ 	 	∩ _ _ 	∅ Then 
Delete m from	 _ _ , 
where  ∈ 	 	 _ _ 	 	∩ _ _ ; 
Insert m into 	 _ _ 	 ; 
End If 
If  _ _ 	∩ 	 _ _ 	 	∅ Then 
Counter++; 
If counter > 1 Then 
Delete m from		 _ _ 	 ,  
where ∈ 	 _ _ 	∩ 	 _ _ 	 ; 




DET =  _ _ 	;   
Algorithm	2	Byzantine	wormhole	detection	
In Algorithm 2, the steps of Byzantine wormhole detection method are 
presented. The algorithm starts with broadcasting ENQ packets to the one 
hop neighbors and ends up with a DET list which contains all the nodes that 
are attacked by a Byzantine wormhole tunnel. 
 





4.3 Simulating Byzantine Wormhole 
In Byzantine wormhole attack, the attackers as well as the relay nodes are 
authenticated nodes. So, they participate in the network operations and 
perform an attack simultaneously. Two new application layer agents have 
been designed in ns-2 to simulate Byzantine wormhole attack. Their 
functionalities are described below: 
 regularAgent: This agent is attached to each node and used for 
allocating PT_REGULARAGENT type packets, such as HELLO, 
HELLOrep, ENQ and ENQrep. Both one hop and three hop neighbor 
lists are maintained by this agent. Moreover, the topological 
comparison algorithm and detection of Byzantine tunnels are 
implemented in regularAgent.   
 Tunnel: This agent does the encapsulation, silent forwarding, 
decapsulation and rebroadcasting of the PT_REGULARAGENT 
type packets. The Tunnel agent is utilized by the attackers 
(including the relay nodes) so that PT_REGULARAGENT type 
packets can be tunneled from one location to the other. Upon 
receiving a PT_REGULARAGENT type packet, an attacker (not 
the relay nodes) encapsulates it into a TUNNEL type packet. The 
TUNNEL type packets can only be processed (forward or 
decapsulate) either by a relay node or by an attacker. In this way, 
regular packets from one network location can be tunneled to 
another location.  
In Chapter 3, two methods of measuring RTT between a pair of nodes is 
discussed. Modification of the MAC layer is also necessary if clocks are 
synchronized. Two additional fields (prop_t and clock) are used in 
PT_REGULARAGENT type packets for doing RTT measurement in a 
synchronized system. The values of prop_t and clock are updated in the 
MAC layer of a node so that upper layer delays are avoided.   





4.4 Byzantine Wormhole Detection in AODV 
Routing Protocol 
The following steps are followed to implement topological comparison 
based Byzantine wormhole detection method in AODV routing protocol:  
 Two additional headers, represented by hop_count and alert_on, 
are used in RREP packet. The hop_count field tracks the number of 
hops the RREP packet has traveled. On the other hand, the alert_on 
field is used to alert the source about a possible Byzantine 
wormhole attack. By default, alert_on is set to 0 which means that 
there is no suspicion about a Byzantine wormhole tunnel. However, 
if a RREP relay node suspects the route is under attack, the 
alert_on field is set to 1 before the RREP packet is forwarded.  
 An additional type of packet (CLEAR) is used to let the source 
know the outcome of the topological comparison algorithm.  
 When a source (s) wants to send data packets to a destination (d) but 
does not have a route, it broadcasts RREQ.  
 A recipient either rebroadcasts the RREQ or replies with RREP back 
to the source. A node only sends RREP if it it has a route to the 
destination.  
 The RREP propagates through the reverse path of the RREQ. If the 
RREP is generated by node d, hop_count is set to 0. Otherwise, 
hop_count is set according to the routing table entry for node d. 
Each relay node of the RREP packet increments the hop_count. 
 When a relay node (r) receives an RREP suggesting that the 
destination (d) is at least three hops away from it, the RREP is held 
and the following steps are followed: 
o Node r sends HELLO to node x which is three hops 
downstream from node r.    
o Upon receiving the HELLOrep from node x, node r calculates 
the RTT and compares it with the RTTavg of one hop 





neighbors. (It is assumed that each node periodically updates 
its one hop neighbor list and the associated RTTavg.)   
o If the RTT comparison suggests that node x is a suspected 
three hop neighbor and therefore may be attacked by a 
Byzantine wormhole tunnel, the topological comparison 
phase is triggered. At this stage, node r releases the RREP 
packet towards the sender (s) with the alert_on field set to 1.    
o The topological comparison phase is initiated by sending 
ENQ to the one hop neighbors. A recipient of ENQ packet 
calculates the RTT with node x. Then the status of node x 
(trusted/suspected) is attached to the ENQrep packet.  
o If ENQrep from all one hop neighbors suggests that node x is 
a suspicious three_hop neighbor and therefore may be under 
attack, node r sends a CLEAR message to the source 
indicating that the route to the destination is under Byzantine 
wormhole attack.         
 When the source receives the RREP with alert_on set to 0, it starts 
sending data packets to node d. However, if the alert_on field is set 
to 1 by relay node (r), the source halts the data transmission until a 
CLEAR message received from node r. 
 If the CLEAR message indicates that the destination is safe, the 
source may starts transmitting data packets. On the other hand, if the 
CLEAR message suggests that the destination is under attack, the 
source stops any further communication until for a predefined time 
interval. 
The performance is evaluated in terms of detection rate and accuracy of 
alarm for 30 nodes. Nodes are placed randomly in a 1000m×1000m area, 
and the attackers are placed in between the target nodes. Finally, the 
performance of the topological detection approach is compared with the 
RTT-only phase.          




























































In Fig. 4.10, the detection rate vs. tunnel length is presented. The detection 
rate is defined as the proportion of the number of wormhole links detected 
and the total number of wormhole links. The detection rate increases as the 
tunnel length is increased. It is due to the fact that longer tunnel involves 
more relay nodes. So, the RTT of wormhole links is longer and easier to be 
identified. Moreover, when the topological comparison is done it becomes 
more obvious that a fake three hop neighbor will be detected. It can also be 
seen that the detection rate of the topological comparison based approach is 
higher than the RTT-only approach. This is because the topological 
comparison based approach gives the suspected neighbors a second chance 
to prove their reliability. Even if a fake three hop neighbor is initially 
included in the Trusted_three_hop list, topological comparison can detect it.  
In Fig. 4.11, the detection accuracy vs. tunnel length is shown. The 
detection accuracy is defined as the proportion of the number of link 
containing wormhole tunnel and the total number of detection. It can be 
seen that the detection accuracy of the topological comparison based 
approach is consistently high (around 95%), irrespective of the tunnel 
length. Moreover, the detection accuracy of the RTT-only approach is 
lower than the topological comparison based approach. It is because that the 
RTT-only approach detects wormhole links by only considering the round 
trip time (RTT). As a result, if a real neighbor is suffering congestion, it is 
also detected as wormhole attacked in RTT-only method.    
4.5 Security of the Detection Method 
The Byzantine wormhole detection method itself may be a target of 
modification attack. Therefore, we propose to encrypt the unicast packets 
like ENQ, ENQrep, RREP, and CLEAR to minimize the adversary effect of 
modification attack. As mentioned in Chapter 3, designing authentication 
and cryptographic schemes is outside the scope of this study. So, we suggest 
to use the authentication and encryption methods proposed in [27] to further 
improve the security of the network. 





4.6 Message Overhead  
In the Byzantine wormhole detection method proposed in this thesis, we use 
HELLO, HELLOrep, ENQ, ENQrep and CLEAR messages. Although this 
incurs some message overhead to the system, it can be tolearted by 
considering the performance of the detection method and the range of 
difficulties the attacker may impose to the system.     
4.7 Summary 
The impact of Byzantine tunnels on the topology of a network has been 
discussed in this chapter. Besides, a topological comparison based approach 
of detecting Byzantine wormhole attack has been presented. We then 
incorporated our Byzantine wormhole detection method into AODV routing 
protocol. Computer simulations have been carried out using the network 
simulator (ns-2) tool. The simulation results show that the topological 
comparison based approach can achieve both high detection rate and high 
accuracy of alarms.  
  




5. Conclusion and Future Work 
5.1 A Review of the Research Contributions  
The aim of this thesis is to develop topological comparison based detection 
methods for both traditional and Byzantine wormhole attacks. The major 
contributions of this research can be listed as follows: 
 A new RTT measurement scheme has been developed to measure 
RTTs between a node and all its n hop neighbors. The aim of this 
RTT measurement scheme is to create a suspected n hop neighbor 
list. 
 A topological comparison based detection method for traditional 
wormhole attack has been presented in Chapter 3. In this method, 
the originator of the wormhole detection process creates a suspected 
one hop list and then runs the topological comparison algorithm. 
The applicability of this method in AODV and OLSR routing 
protocols has also been discussed. Besides, the performance of this 
detection method (in terms of detection rate and accuracy of alarm) 
is compared with some of the existing methods. The results suggest 
that the topological comparison based approach performs better than 
the existing methods.   
 In Chapter 4, one more topological comparison scheme has been 
presented to detect Byzantine wormhole tunnels. Unlike the 
traditional wormhole detection method, three hop topologies are 
compared between the originator and its one hop neighbors. The 
AODV implementation of this method has also been presented. 
Then, the performance in terms of detection rate and accuracy of 
alarm has been measured. The results suggest that both high 
detection rate and accuracy of alarm can be achieved. 
  




5.2 Future Work  
More performance evaluation of the topological comparison based 
wormhole detection methods can be done by considering larger network 
size and complex topologies in dense networks. In addition, node mobility 
can also be included. Furthermore, a complete secured routing protocol can 
be developed which not only does the routing but also secures the routes 
from wormhole attacks (traditional or Byzantine).           
 











set opt(chan)      Channel/WirelessChannel 
set opt(prop)      Propagation/TwoRayGround 
set opt(netif)      Phy/WirelessPhy 
set opt(mac)      Mac/802_11 
set opt(ifq)       Queue/DropTail/PriQueue 
set opt(ll)      LL 
set opt(ant)      Antenna/OmniAntenna 
set opt(x)      1600 
set opt(y)      1600 
set opt(ifqlen)      50 
set opt(seed)      0.0 
set opt(adhocRouting)    AODV 
set opt(nn)      30 
set opt(t_l)       3 
set opt(stop)      100.0 
set opt(dist_min)      90 






















    ‐llType    $opt(ll) \ 
    ‐macType  $opt(mac) \ 
    ‐ifqType    $opt(ifq) \ 
    ‐ifqLen    $opt(ifqlen) \ 






    ‐phyType  $opt(netif) \ 
    ‐channelType  $opt(chan) \ 
    ‐topoInstance  $topo \ 
    ‐agentTrace  ON \ 
    ‐routerTrace  ON \ 











































      set ind 0 
      set count 0 





      set y_c [$r2 uniform $strt_y $lim_y] 
      foreach m $list1 { 
        set dist [ expr sqrt(pow(($x_c ‐ [ lindex $list1 
$ind ]), 2) + pow(($y_c ‐ [ lindex $list2 $ind ]), 2)) ] 
        if { $dist < $opt(dist_min)  } { 
          incr count   
        } 
         if { [expr $ind + 1] < [llength $list1] } { 
           incr ind 
        } 
      } 
      if { $count == 0 } { 
        foreach m $list1 { 
          set dist [ expr sqrt(pow(($x_c ‐ [ 
lindex $list1 $ind ]), 2) + pow(($y_c ‐ [ lindex $list2 $ind ]), 2)) ] 
          if { $dist < $opt(dist_max) } { 
            lappend list1 $x_c 
            lappend list2 $y_c 
            incr i 
            break 
          } 
        } 




































      set max_count $counter_dis 
      set source $index 
      set target_node $n 
      set distance $dist 

































      set x_c [expr [lindex $list1 $ind]+$additive] 
      set y_c [expr $x_c*$target_slp + $c] 















      $ns attach‐agent $node_($j) $a($j) 
    } else { 
      set b($j) [new Agent/Tunnel] 








































The probability of not having a common one hop neighbor 


















In Fig. A.1, the overlapped transmission area of two nodes, A and B, is 
shown. Both A and B have common transmission radius (R) and the 
distance between them is D. If we calculate the area of the overlapped 
transmission zone, we can calculate the probability that no other nodes in 
that area as shown in [49].  
Area of the sector (AMSN) 	 ∗ ∗ 	 	 
    	 ∗ ∗  
    	 ∗ ∗ θ	  
    cos   
Area of the triangle (AMN) 	 ∗ ∗ 	 
    	 ∗ ∗  












    	 ∗ 	   
Area of the overlap, A(D) =  2 ∗ 	 	 	 	 	 	  
    = 2 ∗ cos ∗ 	  
Now, as shown in [49], the probability that there are 0 nodes in the 
overlapped area A(D) can be written as:  
 
P0 (D) = ∗ 	
!
 
               =  
Since the distance (D) between two nodes can be maximum R, the distance 
density function can be represented as: 
       P(D) = ∗  
                                                          
=  
Therefore, the probability that there will be no other nodes in the 
overlapped transmission zone A(D) can be written as: 
  P = ∗ 0 	  
    = ∗ 	  
               = ∗ ∗	 ∗ ∗	 	  
    = [ 
∗
∗ ∗ 	–	 ∗ ∗ ∗
] where 0 ≤ D ≤ 250 
   = . ∗ ∗  
We assume that the transmission radius of each node in the netwoek is 250 
meter. The probabability graph for different node density is shown in Fig. 
A.2 in the next page. In the figure, we can see that in most cases two nodes 
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